Conversion, Culture and Cognitive Categories – 2

Conversion and category differences

What does it mean to be a Christian? Before we can answer this question we must look more closely at our own thought patterns—at what we mean by the word “Christian.” This word, like many other words, refers to a set of people or things that we think are alike in some manner or other. It refers to a category that exists in our minds. To be sure, God, looking at the hearts of people, knows who are his. It is he who one day will divide between the saved and the lost. But here on earth, we as humans pass judgments, we decide for ourselves who is a Christian, and, therefore, what it means to be a Christian. What criteria do we commonly use?

Before we answer this question, we must ask an even more fundamental question: what kind of category are we going to use? Modern studies of human thought (see bibliography) show us that our mind forms categories in at least three different ways, and each of the three kinds of categories has its own structural characteristics. For our discussion here we will look at two of these types: (1) bounded sets and (2) centered sets.[1]

1. Bounded sets

Many of our words refer to bounded sets: “apples,” “oranges,” “pencils,” and “pens,” for instance. In fact, the English language, probably borrowing from the Greek, uses bounded sets for most of its nouns—the basic building blocks of the language.

What is a bounded set? How does our mind form it? In creating a bounded set our mind puts together things that share some common characteristics “Apples,” for example, are objects that are “the firm fleshy somewhat round fruit of a Rosaceous tree. They are usually red, yellow or green and are eaten raw or cooked.”[2]

Bounded sets have certain structural characteristics—that is, they force us to look at things in a certain way (see Figure 2). Let us use the category “apples” to illustrate some of these:

a. The category is created by listing the essential characteristics that an object must have to be within the set. For example, an apple is (1) a kind of “fruit” that is (2) firm, (3) fleshy, (4) somewhat round, and so on. Any fruit that meets these requirements (assuming we have an adequate definition) is an “apple.”

b. The category is defined by a clear boundary. A fruit is either an apple or it is not. It cannot be 70% apple and 30% pear. Most of the effort in defining the category is spent on defining and maintaining the boundary. In other words, not only must we say what an “apple” is, we must also clearly differentiate it from “oranges,” “pears,” and other similar objects that are not “apples.”

c. Objects within a bounded set are uniform in their essential characteristics. All apples are 100% apple. One is not more apple than another. Either a fruit is an apple or it is not. There may be different sizes, shapes, and varieties, but they are all the same in that they are all apples. There is no variation implicit within the structuring of the category.

d. Bounded sets are static sets. If a fruit is an apple, it remains an apple whether it is green, ripe, or rotten. The only change occurs when an apple ceases to be an apple (e.g., being eaten), or when something like an orange is turned into an apple (something we cannot do). The big question, therefore, is whether an object is inside or outside the category. Once it is within, there can be no change in its categorical status.

2. “Christian” as a bounded set:

What happens to our concept of “Christian” if we define it in terms of a bounded set? If we use the above characteristics of a bounded set we come up with the following:

a. We would define “Christian” in terms of a set of essential or definitive characteristics. Because we cannot see into the hearts of people, we generally choose characteristics that we can see or hear, namely tests of orthodoxy (right beliefs) or orthopraxy (right practice) or both.

For example, some define a Christian as a person who believes (gives verbal acknowledgement to) a specific set of doctrines such as the deity of Christ, the virgin birth, and so on. Some make such lists quite long and add on specific doctrines of eschatology or soteriology. Others, convinced that true “belief” is more than a mental argument with a set of statements, look for the evidence of belief in changed lives and behavior. A Christian, then, is one who does not smoke or drink alcohol, and so on.

b. We would make a clear distinction between a “Christian” and a “non-Christian.” There is no place in between. Moreover, maintaining this boundary is critical to the maintenance of the category. Therefore it is essential that we determine who is a Christian and who is not, and to keep the two sharply differentiated. We want to make sure to include those who are truly Christian and to exclude as heretics those who claim to be but are not. To have an unclear boundary is to undermine the very concept of “Christian” itself.

c. We would view all “Christians” as essentially the same. There are old experienced Christians and young converts, but all are Christian.

d. We would stress evangelism as the major task—getting people into the category. Moreover, we would see conversion as a single dramatic event—crossing the boundary between being a “non-Christian” and being a “Christian.” To do so a person must acquire the defining characteristics which we have outlined above. Crossing the boundary is a decision event. Once a person is a Christian he is 100% Christian. There is essentially (not required by the structure of the category) nothing more for him to acquire. He might grow spiritually, but this is not an essential part of what it means to be a Christian.

Let us return, for a moment, to Papayya. If we think of “Christian” as a bounded set, we must decide what are the definitive characteristics that set a Christian apart from a non-Christian. We may do so in terms of belief in certain essential doctrines. But here we face a dilemma. If we reduce these to so simple a set that we can say Papayya has truly become a Christian (that he has acquired all of the beliefs necessary to become a Christian) are we not in danger of settling for cheap grace? Furthermore, how do we handle the fact that Papayya views the doctrines we do require in different thought forms? Must these be corrected before we are convinced that he is a real Christian?

On the other hand, if we raise the basic requirements for being a Christian too high, we make it impossible for Papayya to become a Christian that night, or that year—for it would take more than a year of careful teaching before he could begin to understand our theological framework.

We face a similar problem in using changes in behavior to define a Christian. There will be changes in Papayya, to be sure, but many of them will not take place immediately. We may see little in the way of a dramatic change by tomorrow. Is he then not a Christian?


[1] In addition to these two, there is a third and possibly a fourth type of category, namely fuzzy sets of one or two types. To be precise these should be referred to as fuzzy subsets.

[2] A composite definition based on the Oxford and the Thorndyke dictionaries.

Author: DanutM

Anglican theologian. Former Director for Faith and Development Middle East and Eastern Europe Region of World Vision International

2 thoughts on “Conversion, Culture and Cognitive Categories – 2”

  1. Here is an interesting quote from Andrew Walls, one of the leading missional thinkers of the day, that is relevant to the topic discussed in tis post:

    “We should also remain alert to the fact that a simple substitution of the culturally new for the culturally old is neither sufficient nor possible when the mental and moral fabric of a society is torn; or when people must live in different worlds of discourse at the same time; or when they are faced with moral and social obligations which belong to different orders, and when those obligations conflict with each other; or when they believe (or half believe) in different universes of power. If there is to be no wound, if people are to make clear moral choices and do so in the faith of Christ, they must be able to integrate their worlds, to knit together the new and the old.”
    – Andrew Walls, “Origins of Older Northern and New Southern Christianity,” in The Missionary Movement in Christian History, p. 75

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